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TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION
OVER CIVIL DISPUTES INVOLVING
NON-INDIANS: AN ASSESSMENT
OF NATIONAL FARMERS UNION
INSURANCE COS. V. CROW TRIBE
OF INDIANS AND A PROPOSAL
FOR REFORM

Long before their contact with Europeans, North American
Indian tribes were independent, self-governing communities 1
with virtually unlimited power over their own members. 2 Several
centuries of dealings with European nations, and later the
United States, have left them in the peculiar position of being
nations 3 within a nation-entities that the federal government,
courts, and legal scholars continue to recognize as sovereign
powers• but that are subject to the "plenary power" of Congress.11 On the one hand, the tribes, as nations, are said to possess inherently all powers held by any sovereign government. 6
The European nations and the United States, until 1871,7 made
treaties with the tribes as they would with any other sovereign
nation, 8 in recognition of their sovereign powers. On the other
1. F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 229 (1982).
2. "[P]rior to European colonization and settlement of the North American continent, Indian tribes and nations possessed full jurisdiction over the territories they occupied and the people within those territories." TASK FORCE FOUR: FEDERAL, STATE, AND
TRIBAL JURISDICTION, REPORT ON FEDERAL, STATE, AND TRIBAL JURISDICTION 1 (Comm.
Print 1976) [hereinafter AIPRC TASK FORCE FouR] (Final Report to American Indian
Policy Review Comm'n).
3. In Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), Chief Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court noted that the term "nation" has been generally applied to the Indians,
recognizing them as "a people distinct from others." Id. at 559. "Nation" is a word of our
own language that has "a definite and well understood meaning" and has been applied to
the Indians in the same sense as to the other nations of the earth. Id. at 559-60.
4. See infra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 36 and accompanying text.
6. 1 AMERICAN INDIAN Poucv REVIEW CoMM'N, FINAL REPORT 101 (Comm. Print 1977)
[hereinafter 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT] (Final Report to Congress).
7. Congress discontinued making treaties with the tribes in 1871. F. COHEN, supra
note 1, at 208 n.8. See Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120, § 1, 16 Stat. 544, 566 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 71 (1982)).
8. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560 (1832).
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hand, these sovereign powers are subject to limitation or divestment by Congress. 9
The powers of a sovereign government are generally understood to include the power to establish courts and exercise jurisdiction over disputes arising within the boundaries of its territory.10 Indian tribes certainly retain such powers to some degree,
but the exact extent of this retention of authority is uncertain.
Although the courts have recognized exclusive tribal court jurisdiction over reservation-based civil cases involving only Indians, 11 the scope of tribal jurisdiction over civil cases involving
both Indians and non-Indians 12 is not yet fully determined. The
extensive interaction between Indians and non-Indians on reservations13 and the increasing willingness and ability of tribal
9. See infra notes 32-47 and accompanying text.
10. "The powers of sovereign governments are familiar: the power to enact laws; the
power to establish court systems; [and) the power to require people to abide by established laws . . . . " 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 99.
11. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 342. The issue of tribal criminal jurisdiction over both
Indians and non-Indians is more complicated. See generally id. at 335-41. In Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978), the Supreme Court concluded that Indian
tribes do not possess retained criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because such jurisdiction would be "inconsistent with their status." Id. at 208 (quoting Oliphant v. Schlie,
544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976), reu'd, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)). Whether tribes retain
criminal jurisdiction over Indians who are members of other tribes remains uncertain. F.
COHEN, supra note 1, at 253 n.90. The General Crimes Act of 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 1152
(1982), specifically reserves to the tribes jurisdiction over crimes committed by one Indian against another. The Indian Crimes Act of 1976, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. III 1985),
establishes federal jurisdiction over 16 enumerated crimes. This is generally understood
to eliminate tribal jurisdiction over those offenses, although such a conclusion is not required by a literal reading of the statute or by its legislative history. AIPRC TASK FORCE
FouR, supra note 2, at 36-37.
12. This Note will use the term "non-Indians" to include Indians who are not members of the tribe whose court system is asserting jurisdiction. "Indians" refers to members of the tribe asserting adjudicatory jurisdiction.
13. The United States holds title to approximately 52.5 million acres of land in trust
for Indian tribes and individuals. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 471. Tribal property is held
in common for the benefit of all living tribal members. Id. at 472. Federal statutory
restraints on the alienation of tribal land preserve the Indian land base. Id. at 509. From
1887 to 1934, however, the tribal land base was seriously depleted by federal allotment
policy. The General Allotment Act of 1887, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1982 & Supp. III 1985),
authorized allotment of reservation lands to individual Indians. Eventually, a large portion of the allotted land was conveyed to non-Indians. Further allotment of Indian lands
was prohibited by the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified
as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). Those reservations that
were subject to allotment "frequently have 'a crazy patchwork quilt or checkerboard'
pattern of land ownership: non-Indian lands held in fee patent, individual Indian allotments held in trust, and tribal lands held in trust." AIPRC TASK FORCE FouR, supra
note 2, at 94. On some reservations, the majority of the land ownership and the population within reservation boundaries is non-Indian. Id. at 94-95. For a more complete discussion of tribal property, see F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 471-574.
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courts to claim and exercise broader jurisdiction 1 " make it necessary to determine definitively the extent of tribal adjudicatory
authority where non-Indian litigants are involved.
This Note examines the issue of tribal court jurisdiction over
cases in which both Indians and non-Indians are parties and discusses the Supreme Court's most recent statement on the issue.
In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 111 an Indian minor brought a personal injury action in
Crow Tribal Court16 against a Montana school district operating
a school on state-owned land within the Crow Reservation. The
Supreme Court concluded that the tribal court itself should first
determine whether it has the power to exercise civil subject-matter jurisdiction over non-Indian property owners in a tort case. 17
Defendants contesting tribal court jurisdiction can seek federal
review of the tribal exercise of jurisdiction in district court only
after exhausting the remedies available in the tribal court
system. 18
Part I of this Note sets out the relationship between the tribes
and the federal government and traces the development of the
tribal court systems. Part II discusses the National Farmers
Union case and critiques the Supreme Court opinion. Part III
proposes a plan for formal federal recognition of individual
tribes' civil jurisdiction over cases in various subject-matter areas in which both non-Indians and Indians are parties. Such a
program would end uncertainty over the scope of tribal court
civil jurisdiction and secure to the tribes the authority to adjudicate reservation-based civil disputes, thus aiding in the fulfillment of the federal policy of strengthening tribal government.

I.

THE FEDERAL-INDIAN RELATIONSHIP AND INDIAN TRIBAL
COURTS

The United States and the Indian tribes enjoy a unique relationship. Although Indian tribes possess attributes of sovereignty that, as a general rule, exempt them from state laws and
14. Recently, tribes have been more willing to assert jurisdiction over cases involving
non-Indians. NATIONAL AM. INDIAN COURT JUDGES Ass'N, INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE
31, 47 (1978) [hereinafter INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE].
15. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
16. Sage v. Lodge Grass School Dist., 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 6019 (Crow Trib. Ct. 1982).
17. 471 U.S. at 856.
18. Id. at 856-57.
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state regulation, the tribes are subject to the plenary authority
of the federal government. The exercise of the United States'
power, however, is limited by the federal government's fiduciary
duties toward the tribes. As part of its fiduciary responsibility,
the federal government has sought to guarantee to tribes the administration of justice on reservation lands-a crucial element of
tribal self-government.

A.

Tribal Sovereignty

The proper starting point for any discussion or decision with
respect to Indian tribes and the jurisdiction they possess is the
concept of tribal sovereignty. 19 Congress and the courts have
recognized the sovereign status of Indian tribes from the earliest
days of the Republic. 20 The most important judicial statement
on this subject was made by the Supreme Court in Worcester v.
Georgia. 21 In holding that state law could have no effect on
Cherokee lands in Georgia, 22 Chief Justice John Marshall found
that Indian tribes were "distinct, independent political communities."23 European nations, and later the United States, entered
into treaties with the Indians, in recognition of "their title to
self-government. " 24
Although respect for tribal sovereignty has waned at times
with vacillations in the federal government's Indian policy, 26 it
has nonetheless survived and has received increasing support
from the federal government since the 196O's. The Indian Self19. 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6; at 101; AIPRC TASK FORCE FouR, supra
note 2, at 1.
20. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 233; see also 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at
100 ("The status of Indian tribes as sovereigns, or governments, has been uniformly recognized by Congress and the courts from prerevolutionary days through the present.").
21. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
22. Id. at 561 ("The Cherokee nation ... is a distinct community, occupying its own
territory ... in which the laws of Georgia can have no force . . . . ").
23. Id. at 559.
24. Id. at 560.
25.
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Supreme Court emphasized the
plenary authority of Congress in relation to tribal sovereignty as Congress began
to exercise its broad power to deal with Indian affairs. . . .
With passage of the Curtis Act of 1898 and the abolishment of the Indian
Territory, tribal government lapsed into a period of dormancy. The policy trend
toward destruction of tribal government was reversed in 1934 with passage of
the Indian Reorganization Act.
1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 101 (citations omitted).

FALL

1986]

Tribal Court Jurisdiction

221

Determination and Educational Assistance Act of 197526 recognized "the obligation of the United States to respond to the
strong expression of the Indian people for self-determination" 27
by providing a mechanism whereby the tribes themselves could
administer many federal programs on the reservations. 28 The
Supreme Court has also reaffirmed the continuing vitality of the
concept of tribal sovereignty. 29 Finally, the executive branch has
sought to strengthen tribal sovereignty. 30 President Reagan has
stated that he wishes "to restore tribal governments to their
rightful place among the governments of this nation and to enable tribal governments . . . to resume control over their own
affairs. " 31

B. Federal Authority over the Tribes
Although Worcester v. Georgia 32 held that Indian tribes are
not subject to state law within the reservation and have exclusive authority within their territorial boundaries, 33 later cases
have made it clear that the tribes are subject to the superior
authority of the United States. 34 Thus, although the states generally cannot regulate affairs on reservations, the United States
26. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
27. Id. § 450a(a).
28. Id. §§ 450a, 450f, 450g. For citations of other important Indian legislation of the
1970's, see M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 88-89 (2d ed. 1983).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (upholding the congressional power to delegate authority to a tribal council to regulate distribution of alcoholic beverages on the reservation and stating that "Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory").
30. "In 1970 President Nixon served notice in a message to Congress that he intended to steer a policy course designed to strengthen tribal sovereignty, transfer control
of Indian programs from federal to tribal governments, restore and protect the Indian
land base, and forever declare an end to involuntary termination." M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 28, at 88 (citing MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
TRANSMITTING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. (1970)).
31. President's American Indian Policy Statement, 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 98,
101 (Jan. 24, 1983). More recently, in proclaiming American Indian Week, 1986, President Reagan stated: "We look to the future with the expectation of even stronger tribal
governments and lessened Federal control over tribal government affairs. We look to a
future of development of economic independence and self-sufficiency, and an enhanced
government-to-government relationship that will allow greater Indian control of Indian
resources." 51 Fed. Reg. 42,815 (1986).
32. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
33. Id. at 557.
34. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 327 (1978) ("It is true that in
the exercise of the powers of self-government, as in all other matters, the Navajo Tribe,
like all Indian tribes, remains subject to ultimate federal control.").
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can. 811 Federal power over Indian affairs is in fact often described
as "plenary." 36 In construing the scope of this power, the Supreme Court has relied primarily on the Indian Commerce
Clause, 37 the Treaty Clause,38 and the Supremacy Clause 39 as
sources of broad federal power over Indian affairs. 40 Aside from
the Indian Commerce Clause, the Constitution mentions Indians
explicitly only in article 141 and in the fourteenth amendment, 42
which exclude "Indians not taxed" from the count for determining apportionment of taxes and representatives to Congress.
Federal authority over the tribes has also been supported by
congressional power to spend money for the "general Welfare of
the United States,"' 3 the Necessary and Proper Clause," the
Property Clause,411 and the war powers of Congress. 46 The combination of these specific constitutional provisions constitutes a
single power over Indian affairs47 in the hands of the federal
government.
1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 100:
While the opinion in Worcester v. Georgia holds that Indian tribes are not
subject to state law, later cases make it clear that Indian tribal sovereignty, or
self-government, is subject to the superior legislative authority of Congress. To
put it another way, Georgia could not regulate affairs on the Cherokee reservation, but the United States could.
36. Id. at 101; F. CoHEN, supra note 1, at 207.
37. Congress is authorized to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Cases noting
Congress' power under the Indian Commerce Clause include United States v. Antelope,
430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977), and McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 411 U.S.
164, 172 n.7 (1973).
38. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The national government is granted exclusive authority to enter into treaties. Congress ratified many treaties with the Indians until 1871
and has enacted statutes relating to them. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 152-153, 157-158 (1982)
(regulating the disposition of proceeds of land ceded to the United States by Indian
treaties).
39. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2. Valid exercises of federal constitutional power over Indian affairs are the "supreme Law of the Land" and supersede conflicting state constitutional and statutory provisions. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 211.
40. These three constitutional clauses are the ones that courts most often refer to in
discussing the source of federal power over Indian affairs. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 211.
41. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
42. Id. amend. XIV, § 2.
43. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; see also 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 106;
F. CoHEN, supra note 1, at 210 n.21 (citing Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974)).
44. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also F. CoHEN, supra note 1, at 211 n.24 (citing
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)).
45. U.S. CoNST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. For a discussion of congressional power over Indian
affairs under the Property Clause, see F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 209-10.
46. U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 8, els. 1, 11-12, 15-17. Congress' war powers "underlay much
of the federal exercise of authority over Indians during the early history of the Republic." F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 210.
47. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 211.
35.
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The Federal Trust Responsibility

Although federal authority over the tribes has been described
as "plenary,"'8 the Supreme Court has recognized limitations on
the exercise of this authority. 49 These limitations stem from the
Constitution itself,6° respect for Indian sovereignty,'11 and the
special trust relationship between the United States and the
tribes.
Chief Justice Marshall first explained the trust relationship in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. 62 Noting that "the relation of the
Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal
distinctions which exist [nowhere] else," 113 Marshall described
their relationship with the United States as that of a ward and
guardian. 114 As "domestic dependent nations,"1111 the Indian tribes
rely on the federal government for protection. 116
Marshall underscored this protective relationship in Worcester v. Georgia. 117 He stated that the United States had assumed
the role of providing protection to the Indians. 118 This did not,
however, extinguish the tribes' status as sovereign governments.119 Instead, the United States assumed a fiduciary obligation to guarantee the security and integrity of the tribes as independent political communities in exchange for their friendliness
48. Felix Cohen summarized the meaning of Congress' "plenary" power over the Indians as follows: "[A)lthough in practice Congress leaves much governing authority to
the tribes, federal power over Indians is 'plenary' in the sense that in Indian matters
Congress can exercise broad police power, rather than only the powers of a limited government with specifically enumerated powers." Id. at 220. "Plenary" is thus not synonymous with "absolute" or "total," but rather "appears to be used as a summary of the
congressional powers over Indians." Id. at 219.
49. For a discussion of the limitations on the exercise of federal power, see id. at 21728.
50. See id. at 217-20.
51. See Note, A Proposal for Extension of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
to Indian-Owned Businesses on Reservations, 18 U. Mien. J.L. REF. 473, 482 (1985).
52. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
53. Id. at 16.
54. Id. at 17.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
58. Id. at 552.
59.
[T]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not
surrender its independence-its right to self-government, by associating with a
stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its
safety, may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state.
Id. at 560-61.
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to the United States. 80 The Supreme Court has stated that the
federal government's exercise of its authority over Indians must
be rationally related to the fulfillment of this obligation81 and
"based on a determination that the Indians will be protected."82
D.

The Development of Tribal Courts

One of the traditional attributes of sovereignty that the
United States, as fiduciary and guardian, has undertaken to
guarantee to the tribes is adjudicatory authority. Such authority
over disputes within its territory is a crucial element of any sovereign's self-government. 83 The Indian tribes exercised this authority, until the late nineteenth century, in keeping with traditional mechanisms of tribal justice, which differed from tribe to
tribe as well as differing from "Western" systems of justice. 84
Tribal and civil jurisdiction were exclusive within the tribe's territory; this still remains the case, except where the federal government or actions of the tribes have imposed limitations. 86 Ad60. "The United States assumed a fiduciary obligation, insuring the tribes' continuing integrity as self-governing entities within certain territory." F. COHEN, supra note 1,
at 234. One manifestation of the United States' fiduciary obligation is the federal government's holding title to land within reservation boundaries in trust for the tribe or, in
some cases, individuals. See supra note 13. The trust also encompasses the obligation to
provide related services and to take actions necessary to protect self-government. 1
AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 105.
61. In Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), the Supreme Court concluded that
statutes conferring upon tribal Indians a preference for employment in the Bureau of
Indian Affairs did not violate the fifth amendment. "As long as the special treatment can
be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress' unique obligation toward the Indians,
such legislative judgments will not be disturbed." Id. at 555.
62. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 221. The trust obligation also constrains federal power
procedurally. In recognition of the federal trust responsibility, the courts have developed
canons to construe federal action when possible as protecting Indian rights. The primary
canons were first developed in treaty cases and require "that treaties be liberally construed to favor Indians, that ambiguous expressions in treaties must be resolved in favor
of the Indians, and that treaties should be construed as the Indians would have understood them." Id. at 222 (footnotes omitted); see also Note, The Canons of Indian Treaty
and Statutory Construction: A Proposal for Codification, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 681
(1984).
63. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
64. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 332. The tribes generally "utilized governing modes
premised upon communal property concepts and administered on the basis of oral customs." AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM INC., JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY
164 (1980) [hereinafter JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY); see also AIPRC TASK FoRCE FouR,
supra note 2, at 121.
65. See 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 114-17; F. COHEN, supra note 1, at
332.
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judicatory authority has thus historically been a strong element
of tribal sovereignty.
Eventually the traditional tribal legal systems declined as a
result of dealings with European nations and the United
States. 66 The federal government, in recognition of the importance of having adequate reservation institutions for adjudication of disputes, established Courts of Indian Offenses, beginning in 1883. 67 By 1890, Courts of Indian Offenses operated at
two-thirds of reservation agencies. 66
During the 1930's, the federal government decided to encourage the Indian tribes to develop their governments. Improvement of reservation court systems was recognized as a crucial element in revitalizing tribal governmental authority. Under
the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934,69 tribes were to organize
their own governments by adopting constitutions and bylaws. 70
In 1935, Commissioner of Indian Affairs John Collier promulgated a revised Code of Indian Tribal Offenses for the Courts of
Indian Offenses. 71 The new Code expressly set out the right of
the tribes to replace the Courts of Indian Offenses and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Code with their own courts and
66. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 332-33. There were some exceptions to this general
decline in traditional legal systems. At the time the Courts of Indian Offenses, see infra
notes 67-68 and accompanying text, were being developed, the Five Civilized Tribes
(Choctaw, Cherokee, Chickasaw, Creek, and Seminole), the New York Indians, the
Osage, the Pueblos, and the Eastern Cherokees all had their own justice systems. AIPRC
TASK FORCE FouR, supra note 2, at 123 n.7. The Cherokees established a central government incorporating Anglo-American institutions. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 332 n.4.
67. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 333. Aside from filling a void perceived in the provision of law and order on reservations where traditional legal systems had declined, these
courts were also intended as a competing center of authority to reduce the remaining
power of traditional tribal leaders. Id.
68. AIPRC TASK FORCE FouR, supra note 2, at 123; see also JUSTICE IN INDIAN CouNTRY, supra note 64, at 165 (noting widespread tribal resistance to the Courts of Indian
Offenses). Congress never expressly authorized the courts, but began funding them in
1888. F. CoHEN, supra note 1, at 333 n.15. The validity of the courts was sustained in
United States v. Clapox, 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888). See infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
69. Ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985)). For a discussion of the Indian Reorganization Act, see Comment, Tribal SelfGovernment and the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 70 MICH. L. REV. 955 (1972).
70. 25 u.s.c. § 476 (1982).
71. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 333; see 25 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1986). A Code of Indian
Offenses was first set out in regulations issued by the Secretary of the Interior in 1884.
JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 64, at 165. The 1935 revised Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA) Code, with minor changes, is still in force. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 333.
Since publication of the 1935 BIA Code in the Code of Federal Regulations, Courts of
Indian Offenses have also been called "CFR courts." JusTJCE IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra
note 64, at 167 n.40. Changes in the BIA Code have recently been proposed. See 50 Fed.
Reg. 43,235 (1985); see also 51 Fed. Reg. 400 (1986) (extending comment period).
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codes. 72 Tribal approval was required for appointments of judges
to the remaining Courts of Indian Offenses. 73
Since 1935, most tribes have shown their interest in exercising
their adjudicatory authority by developing their own court systems and adopting judicial codes. 74 Almost all of the tribes, however, chose to base their codes and judicial systems at least in
part on the BIA Code and courts.7 11 Consequently, most tribes
have courts and codes based on Anglo-American concepts of
civil and criminal law. 76 Although the tribal court systems are
thus not truly "Indian" legal systems, what is most significant
about them is that they are operated by the tribes themselves
and provide for tribal administration of justice on the
reservation.
Some tribal court systems further reflect the influence of
the BIA Code by limiting their civil jurisdiction to that of
the Courts of Indian Offenses: "all suits wherein the defendant
is a member of the tribe or tribes within their jurisdiction,
and . . . all other suits between members and nonmembers
which are brought before the courts by stipulation of both
parties."77 Federal courts, 78 Congress, 79 and the executive
72. 25 C.F.R. § 11.l(e) (1986).
73. Id. § 11.3(b).
74. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 334; JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra note 64, at 171.
Such courts are referred to as "tribal courts," in contrast to the remaining Courts of
Indian Offenses, or CFR courts. INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 11.
75. F. COHEN, supra note I, at 334; INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at
11. Only a very few tribes, principally the Pueblos of New Mexico, maintain traditional
systems of justice based on unwritten customs. Id.; JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY, supra
note 64, at 170. Indian courts thus fall into three categories: "tribal courts," operating
under constitutions and codes adopted by the tribes; "CFR courts," the remaining
Courts of Indian Offenses established pursuant to provisions of the Code of Federal Regulations; and "traditional courts," customary judicial institutions like those maintained
by the Pueblo tribes in New Mexico, which little resemble Anglo-American models. Id. at
170-71. A discussion of the CFR courts and traditional courts is beyond the scope of this
Note.
76. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 334.
77. 25 C.F.R. § 11.22 (1986); see also Canby, Civil Jurisdiction and the Indian Reservation, 1973 UTAH L. REv. 206, 221.
78. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), the Supreme Court stated:
"Tribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive
adjudication of disputes affecting important personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians." Id. at 65. In Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), the Supreme
Court recognized exclusive tribal court jurisdiction in an action brought by a non-Indian
against an Indian upon a reservation-based debt. The Court stated: "It is immaterial
that respondent is not an Indian. He was on the Reservation and the transaction with an
Indian took place there. . .. The cases in this Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian governments over their reservations." Id. at 223.
79. Congress. has never enacted general legislation to provide a federal or state forum
for civil disputes between Indians and non-Indians on the reservation. In 1953, Congress
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branch, 80 however, have acknowledged that the tribes do not
have to limit their jurisdiction to such an extent, and have recognized the validity of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over civil
cases arising on the reservation in which non-Indians as well as
Indians are parties. Some tribes have elected to extend tribal
court jurisdiction over all civil cases arising within the reservation.81 Recently, more tribes have decided to expand the exercise
of their jurisdiction over civil cases involving non-Indians. 82
Because of its broad authority over Indian affairs, Congress
. could statutorily define the limits of the civil jurisdiction of tribal, state, and federal courts in reservation-based disputes, as it
has done to some extent in the area of criminal jurisdiction,83
and thus end uncertainty over whether tribes have the authority
to exercise jurisdiction over reservation-based civil cases that involve both Indians and non-Indians. It has declined to do so,
however, and has, thus far, left resolution of the issue to the
courts. The Supreme Court, as well, has declined to state an
across-the-board rule. The tribes and their members, as well as
any individuals or entities that have dealings with the reservations and their residents, are thus faced with uncertainty as to
whether tribal court exercises of jurisdiction will be respected or
struck down by federal courts. This situation discourages the
full development of tribal self-government and tribal economies, 84 thus undercutting congressional and executive policy toward the tribes.
provided for state civil and criminal judicial jurisdiction on some reservations and for
voluntary assumptions by states of jurisdiction over other reservations. Act of Aug. 15,
1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1982) (criminal) and
28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982 & Supp. III 1985) (civil)). After 1968, states could no longer
assume jurisdiction without tribal consent. 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
Apparently, the 1953 Act does not deprive tribal courts on affected reservations of concurrent civil adjudicatory jurisdiction. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 254 n.95. Furthermore,
Indian treaties did not provide for tribal relinquishment of civil jurisdiction over causes
of action involving non-Indians. Id. at 254.
80. "An Indian tribe may exercise a complete jurisdiction over its members and
within the limits of the reservation, subordinate only to the expressed limitations of
Federal law." Powers of Indian Tribes, 1 Op. Solie. Interior 445, 475 (1934) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added). This statement seems to encompass tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction over all causes of action arising within reservation boundaries.
81. See, e.g., infra note 86 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 11.
84. See generally Oversight of Economic Development on Indian Reservations:
Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
As Senator William Cohen stated, "The existence of a reliable tribal government, however, is critical to the development of the reservation. Without that, private sector inter-
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NATIONAL FARMERS UNION INSURANCE Cos. v. CRow TRIBE
OF INDIANS

In National Farmers Union, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
tribal sovereignty by requiring exhaustion of tribal court remedies before a federal district court can review tribal assertions of
civil adjudicatory jurisdiction. This reaffirmation is undermined,
however, by the establishment of a layer of federal court review
above the tribal court system. Because of this judicial interference with the federal policy of strengthening tribal self-government, the decision does not provide a wholly satisfactory approach to the jurisdictional issue.
A.

The National Farmers Union Decision

Leroy Sage, a member of the Crow Tribe and a student at
Lodge Grass Elementary School on the Crow Reservation, was
struck by a motorcycle on school grounds after returning from a
school outing, and sustained severe injuries to his leg. 8 ~ The
child and his guardian brought a negligence suit against the
school district in Crow Tribal Court, which the tribe had given
authority to exercise jurisdiction "over all civil causes of action
arising within the exterior boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. " 88 Process was served on the chairman of the school
board, but the school district did not answer the complaint or
appear in tribal court to contest jurisdiction. The tribal court
found the school district negligent under Montana law87 and enests will be reluctant to enter into compacts concerning the communal property of the
tribe." Id. at 2. One tribal spokesman stressed that "[s)trong and effective government
can develop and carry out community-determined programs supportive of balanced social and economic growth, and can establish a climate conducive to private sector investment, markets, and job opportunities for tribal economies." Id. at 23 (statement of Harry
Earl, Governor, Laguna Pueblo, and Chairman, CERT Economic Development Committee). Tribal courts can play an important role in economic development if they are recognized as the appropriate forum for settling disputes between tribal members and outside
investors and developers.
85. Sage v. Lodge Grass School Dist., 10 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training
Program) 6019, 6019 (Crow Trib. Ct. 1982).
86. Caow TRIB. CooE § 3-2-205, quoted in National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow
Tribe of Indians, 560 F. Supp. 213, 216 (D. Mont. 1983). Jurisdiction over the defendant
school district was based on the fact that it "resides, operates, and transacts business
within the exterior boundaries of the Crow Reservation." Sage, 10 Indian L. Rep. at
6019.
87. 10 Indian L. Rep. at 6019.

FALL

1986)

Tribal Court Jurisdiction

229

tered a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount
of $153,010. 88
When the school district received notice of the default judgment, it notified its insurer, National Farmers Union Insurance
(National), of the suit. Neither the school district nor National
contested the default judgment in tribal court or appealed to the
Crow Tribal Court of Appeals. 89 Instead of pursuing these tribal
remedies, National and the school district obtained a temporary
restraining order from the United States District Court for the
District of Montana prohibiting Sage from enforcing his default
judgment. 90 They also filed suit against the Crow Tribe,91 seeking a permanent injunction against enforcement of the tribal
court judgment.
The district court determined that it had jurisdiction over the
suit under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 92 "to determine whether the Tribal
Court has exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction,"93 and
ruled that National's claim arose under federal common law. 94
The district court held that the Crow Tribal Court did not have
jurisdiction over the tort claim because such jurisdiction was not
delegated to the tribe by statute or treaty, 911 and is not a retained element of inherent sovereignty. 96 The court noted that,

·,,

88. Id. at 6019-20.
89. CROW TRIB. R. C1v. P. 17; Caow TRIB. CooE § 31-1-103; Caow TRIB. R. APP. P. 2,
quoted in National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 736 F.2d 1320,
1321 (9th Cir. 1984).
90. See 736 F.2d at 1321-22.
91. Also named in the suit as defendants were the Tribal Council, the Tribal Court,
judges of the Court, and the Chairman of the Tribal Council. National Farmers Union
Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 848 (1985). Leroy Sage and his guardian
were later added as parties defendant. Id.; see also 736 F.2d at 1322 n.l.
92. Section 1331 gives district courts jurisdiction over "civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1982).
93. 560 F. Supp. 213, 214 (D. Mont. 1983).
94. The court stated,
The jurisdictional question . . . places at issue the extent of tribal court civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians as developed by the Supreme Court in Montana v.
United States-developments that are not drawn from any specific statute or
treaty, but raise the overriding federal interest in determining the extent of tribal sovereignty and therefore form a part of federal common law.
Id. at 214-15 (citation omitted).
95. Id. at 215, 216.
96. Id. at 216-17. In examining this second possible basis for tribal court jurisdiction,
the court assumed that the tribe's adjudicatory and regulatory authority must be coextensive-an assumption that the Court of Appeals found untenable. 736 F.2d at 1322 n.3.
Having made this assumption, the district court analyzed the issue according to the language set out in a case dealing with tribal regulatory jurisdiction over hunting and fishing, Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). The court interpreted Montana as
providing that a tribe may regulate activities of a non-Indian on non-Indian land within
the reservation only where (1) the non-Indian has entered consensual relationships with
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because the tribe did not have power to extend jurisdiction over
the suit and because the tort claim does not present grounds for
federal jurisdiction, the claim belonged in state court. 97 The
court issued a permanent injunction against execution of the tribal court judgment.98
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not reach the
merits of National's challenge to tribal court jurisdiction because
it concluded that the district court's exercise of jurisdiction was
not supported by any constitutional, statutory, or common law
ground. The Ninth Circuit found that National's equal protection and due process claims cannot arise under the Constitution
because tribes are not constrained by the fourteenth amendment. 99 Furthermore, although tribes are bound by the Indian
Civil Rights Act to exercise their jurisdiction in a manner consistent with due process and equal protection, 10° Congress has limited federal court review of claimed violations of the Act to the
single remedy of the writ of habeas corpus. 101 Finally, the court
concluded that recognizing a common law cause of action for alleged abuse of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction would be contrary
the tribe or its members, or (2) where the conduct of the non-Indian "threatens or has
some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe." 560 F. Supp. at 216 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66). The court
held that the first exception did not apply because a personal injury, rather than a consensual arrangement, was at the center of the dispute. Id. This seems to be a misinterpretation of Montana, which arguably concludes that the tribe may regulate all activities
of non-Indians who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members-like
the school district here-not just activities related to specific contracts or leases: "A tribe
may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers
who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial
dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements." Montana, 450 U.S. at 565. The court
found that the second exception did not apply because the conduct in question only
affected the health and welfare of an individual rather than the tribe. 560 F. Supp. at
217. This ignores the fact that the allegedly hazardous conditions were a threat to all
tribal members who might cross the schoolyard. See Sage v. Lodge Grass School Dist., 10
Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6019, 6019 (Crow Trib. Ct. 1982).
97. 560 F. Supp. at 218.
98. Id.
99. 736 F.2d at 1322. The court cited R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing
Authority, 719 F.2d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985), and
Trans-Canada Enterprises v. Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 634 F.2d 474, 476-77 (9th Cir.
1980).
100. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (1982). Title I of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1982), imposed many Bill of Rights provisions on Indian tribes. It
also restricted penalties that tribal courts can impose in criminal cases by stating that
tribal courts can "in no event impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or
punishment greater than imprisonment for a term of six months or a fine of $500, or
both." Id. § 1302(7).
101. 736 F.2d at 1323. This was the holding of Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436
U.S. 49, 66-70 (1977). See infra note 137.
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to Congress' purposeful restriction of federal court interference
with tribal court proceedings to the review of petitions for
habeas corpus. 102 The court added that the tribal court is the
proper forum to determine the scope of its own jurisdiction, at
least in tl}.e first instance. 103
Judge Wright dissented in part and concurred in part. Heargued that the plaintiff had stated a federal common law cause of
action involving a substantial federal question over which the
district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331. 104 He concluded, however, that plaintiffs should be required to exhaust remedies available in the tribal court system
before seeking federal intervention. 1011
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court holding
that federal district courts have jurisdiction over a case such as
National's. Whether a tribe retains jurisdiction over reservationbased disputes that involve non-Indians is a federal question
and must be answered by reference to federal law. 106 The district
court may determine under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 whether a tribal
court has exceeded the lawful limits of its jurisdiction. 107
The Supreme Court distinguished Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 108 which held that tribal courts do not have inherent
criminal jurisdiction to try non-Indians for offenses committed
on the reservation. 109 First, there is no legislation giving the fed102. 736 F.2d at 1323; see also infra note 137.
103. Id. at 1324.
104. Id. at 1324, 1325.
105. Id. at 1326.
106. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852
(1985).
107. Id. at 853.
108. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
109. In his opinion for the Court in Oliphant, Justice Rehnquist noted what he found
to be a "commonly shared presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch and the lower
federal courts" that tribal courts lack the power to try non-Indians. Id. at 206. He concluded that Indian courts lack such jurisdiction absent an affirmative delegation by Congress, id. at 208, because "[b]y submitting to the overriding sovereignty of the United
States, Indian tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try non-Indian citizens
of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress." Id. at 210. He recognized that Indian tribal courts today "resemble in many respects their state counterparts" and that non-Indian crime is prevalent on reservations, but concluded that these
are considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether to authorize jurisdiction.
Id. at 211-12.
In his dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Burger joined, Justice Marshall stated
his view that "[i]n the absence of affirmative withdrawal by treaty or statute, ... Indian
tribes enjoy as a necessary aspect of their retained sovereignty the right to try and punish all persons who commit offenses against tribal law within the reservation." Id. at 212.
For one discussion of the Oliphant decision that questions the accuracy of Justice
Rehnquist's historical and textual analysis, see M. PRICE & R. CLINTON, supra note 28, at
275-76.
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eral courts jurisdiction over civil disputes between Indians and
non-Indians, as there is for criminal matters. 110 Second, principles governing civil jurisdiction on reservations and rules dealing
with tribal criminal jurisdiction have developed in a markedly
different way. m
Having decided against extending Oliphant, the Court
adopted the exhaustion requirement suggested by Judge
Wright. 112 Determination of
the existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction
will require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty,
the extent to which that sovereignty has been altered,
divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in
treaties ·and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial
decisions. 113
Requiring that this examination be conducted in the first instance in the tribal court itself, the Court noted, recognizes Congress' commitment to supporting tribal self-government and
self-determination, serves the orderly administration of justice
by allowing development of a full record in the tribal court, encourages tribal courts to explain the precise basis for exercising
jurisdiction, and provides other courts with the benefit of the
tribal court's expertise in the event of further judicial review. 11 "
B.

The Self-Defeating Rationale of National Farmers Union

To a certain extent, the Supreme Court's decision is quite
favorable to the interests of the tribes. By requiring exhaustion
of tribal remedies, the decision reaffirms the sovereignty of the
tribes and their retention of inherent powers of self-government. 1111 It reiterates the basic principle that tribal court juris110. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Supp. III 1985); see supra note 11.
111. 471 U.S. at 854 n.16, 855 n.17. Congress has never enacted general legislation to
establish a federal or state forum for adjudicating civil disputes between Indians and
non-Indians on reservations. Furthermore, Indian treaties did not provide for tribal relinquishment of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, although they sometimes did require
tribes to surrender non-Indian criminal suspects to federal or state authorities. Id. at 855
n.17; see also supra note 11.
112. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
113. 471 U.S. at 855-56 (footnotes omitted).
114. Id. at 856-57.
115. Id. at 856.
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diction is an element of tribal sovereignty that survives intact
unless altered by federal law. 116 The decision thus indicates continuing judicial respect for the sovereignty of Indian tribes.
The Supreme Court decision also recognizes the commitment
of Congress to a policy of supporting tribal self-determination
and self-government. 117 An important element of self-determination and self-government is exercising authority over disputes
that arise within the territorial boundaries of the reservation.
The tribe has a strong interest in protecting the interests of tribal members and in governing both Indian and non-Indian behavior on the reservation. 118 Also, as a governmental body, the
tribe has a strong interest in providing a forum for the peaceful
resolution of disputes arising on the reservation, as well as an
obligation to provide such a forum. 119 Affording the tribal court
the first opportunity to evaluate the basis for a challenge to its
jurisdiction recognizes tribal interests and obligations and furthers congressional policy regarding tribal governments.
The Supreme Court's decision ensures that initial proceedings
will occur within the court system most able to give the litigants
quick access to a judicial forum. 120 Most Indian reservations are
located in rural areas without ready access to federal or state
courts. 121 If any county courts are available nearby, they are
likely to be unsympathetic to or even hostile toward Indian litigants. 122 Tribal courts provide a forum within the territory in
which the dispute arose and are thus convenient for evidentiary
purposes, and will often be the forum most convenient to the
litigants, especially if they all live on or near the reservation.
Because Indian tribal court proceedings and Indian tribal
codes 123 are largely modeled on Anglo-American models, and because proceedings are generally conducted in English, 12" non-Indian litigants should not find any marked contrast between the
tribal court system and local, state, and federal courts, 1211 other
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Brief for Respondents, National Farmers Union (No. 84-320); see Canby, supra
note 77, at 218-19.
119. Brief for Respondents, supra note 118.
120. INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 89.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 79. By comparison, a survey of Indians and non-Indians indicated that the
only serious bias against non-Indians in tribal courts was that non-Indians were given
heavier fines instead of jail sentences. Id.
123. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
124. INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 68.
125. Id. at 44, 61.
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than perhaps the lower cost of litigation in the tribal court. 128 As
the Supreme Court noted, allowing the development of a full
record in the tribal court also promotes efficiency and the orderly administration of justice in the federal courts and gives the
federal courts the benefit of tribal court expertise in the event of
federal judicial review. 127
Finally, and most importantly, the tribal court may be the
only forum available to the litigants where there is no diversity
between the parties and no federal question as the basis of the
suit, and where jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising on
the reservation has not been delegated to the state. 128 In National Farmers Union, for example, complete diversity of citizenship did not exist so there was no diversity jurisdiction, and
there was no federal question jurisdiction over the tort claim itself. The State of Montana has not obtained jurisdiction over
civil causes of action arising within the Crow Reservation. Consequently, the injured child and his guardian could turn only to
the tribal court. 129
Requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies also provides encouragement to tribal courts, which have endeavored to provide fair,
efficient systems of justice using institutions and concepts of justice that were essentially foreign to the tribes and were initially
thrust upon them. 130 Low levels of funding have inhibited the
development of the tribal court systems, 131 as has the difficulty
of receiving recognition of judgments by surrounding jurisdictions. 132 To train the personnel needed to operate the system,
programs were set up for tribal judges 133 and for lawyers who
will practice before the tribal courts. m Supreme Court deference to tribal jurisdiction necessarily increases the importance of
tribal courts and their decisions, 1311 recognizes their efforts to in126. One reason for the lower cost of litigation in tribal courts is the extensive use of
lay advocates. See id. at 65.
127. 471 U.S. at 856-57; see supra text accompanying note 114.
128. F. COHEN, supra note 1, at 342; Canby, supra note 77, at 220-23. Even if there is
diversity of citizenship between the parties, if the case is one that could not have been
litigated in state court, the federal court may refuse to exercise diversity jurisdiction. Id.
at 219 (citing Hot Oil Serv. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966), and Littell v. Nakai, 344
F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 986 (1966)); see also supra note 79.
129. Brief for Respondents, supra note 118.
130. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
131. INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 57.
132. Id. at 80-81; AIPRC TASK FORCE FOUR, supra note 2, at 128; see also infra notes
191-93 and accompanying text.
133. AIPRC TASK FORCE FouR, supra note 2, at 125, 127.
134. Id. at 125.
135. INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 89.
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stitute and maintain fair and efficient proceedings, and encourages them to exercise fully the authority they possess and to
continue to improve tribal court systems. 136
On the other hand, although the Supreme Court's exhaustion
of tribal remedies requirement is a reaffirmation of tribal sovereignty, providing for an appeal of questions of tribal court jurisdiction to federal district court tends to undercut the tribal system and to make the exhaustion requirement seem like an
empty gesture. In effect, a layer of federal court review is inserted above the tribal court system. This frustrates congressional policy that discourages federal court interference with the
tribal courts. 137
The National Farmers Union decision also undermines present tribal court jurisdiction by providing an opportunity for litigants to contest tribal court jurisdiction over areas in which it is
well-established. 138 Federal and state courts have recognized exclusive tribal jurisdiction over adoption proceedings 139 and divorce proceedings 140 where the parties are Indians. Courts have
also upheld tribal jurisdiction over suits brought by non-Indians
against Indians over debts, 141 torts, 142 and child custody. 143 On
the basis of the National Farmers Union decision, litigants may
136. "Federal judicial deference means that Indian courts must respond to demands
for interpretations of tribal law, review of administrative decisions, and determinations
of the legitimacy of specific tribal actions. Consequently, more judicial business is indicated . . . . " Id.
137. In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), for example, the Supreme Court stated that the Indian Civil Rights Act "was generally understood to authorize federal judicial review of tribal actions only through the habeas corpus provisions
of § 1303." Id. at 70. The Court noted further that this general understanding on the
part of Congress, coupled with "Congress' rejection of proposals that clearly would have
authorized causes of action other than habeas corpus, persuade us that Congress, aware
of the intrusive effect of federal judicial review upon tribal self-government, intended to
create only a limited mechanism for such review." Id.
138. As Felix Cohen has stated, "Tribal authority over cases involving non-Indians is
well established in some circumstances and may exist in others." F. COHEN, supra note 1,
at 342.
139. Id. (citing Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976)).
140. Id. (citing Whyte v. District Court, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d 1012 (1959), cert.
denied, 363 U.S. 829 (1960)).
141. Id. (citing Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (1971); Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217 (1959); Hot Oil Serv. v. Hall, 366 F.2d 295 (9th Cir. 1966)).
142. Id. (citing Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974); Enriquez v.
Superior Court, 115 Ariz. 342, 565 P.2d 522 (1977); Nelson v. Dubois, 232 N.W.2d 54
(N.D. 1975); Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1975)).
143. Id. (citing Wisconsin Potowatomies v. Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (W.D. Mich.
1973); Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333,347 A.2d 228 (1975); In re Buehl, 87 Wash.
2d 649, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976)). The results of these cases are codified in the Indian Child
Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982). See infra text accompanying note
171.
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contest tribal jurisdiction over these areas by arguing that tribal
jurisdiction must be reexamined in accordance with the analysis
suggested by the decision. 144 State court decisions on jurisdiction
may be especially vulnerable to attack because of the National
Farmers Union holding that the extent of tribal jurisdiction is a
federal question to be examined by federal district courts. 1411 Litigants may also, however, attack federal court tribal jurisdiction
decisions for not being based on the National Farmers Union
analysis. The decision thus creates greater uncertainty about tribal court jurisdiction when civil cases involve non-Indians. Tribal courts will have to deal with the uncertainty of not knowing
whether an exercise of jurisdiction will be simply a waste of time
and limited resources.
The opportunity to contest tribal court jurisdiction in federal
court also invites abuse. Litigants who object to the jurisd1ction
of the tribal court are unlikely to pursue their objection if they
are satisfied with the result of the litig~tion in tribal court. Only
if they object to the decision on the merits will they be likely to
challenge jurisdiction in federal court. This amounts to an attack on the merits of the tribal court decision and could further
undermine tribal authority. Such a result is contrary to Congress' and the executive branch's intent to strengthen tribal government, 146 of which the courts are an important element.
III. A

PROPOSED SOLUTION

The Department of the Interior has broad authority over Indian affairs, which has been held to include the power to set up
courts on Indian reservations and prescribe their jurisdiction. 147
The Department should establish a mechanism whereby tribes
could petition for formal recognition of jurisdiction over all reservation-based civil causes of action in various subject areas.
Once formally recognized by the federal government, such jurisdiction should be respected by the courts, thus providing greater
certainty over tribal jurisdiction and strengthening the tribal
court systems.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See
See
See
See

supra note 113 and accompanying text.
supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
infra notes 163-65 and accompanying text.
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The Petition Procedure

Retained tribal sovereignty148 and the traditional powers of
any sovereign to govern disputes arising within its territory 149
provide strong support for the exercise of tribal court jurisdiction over cases arising on the reservation that involve both Indians and non-Indians. Congressional and executive policy aimed
at strengthening tribal government 1110 in furtherance of the federal trust responsibility 1111 and considerations of convenience and
practicality buttress these principles. 1112 Establishing a mechanism for formal federal recognition of tribal court civil jurisdiction can result in greater certainty.
Because tribal court systems differ from each other in both
their ability 1113 and their willingness 1114 to assume jurisdiction
over civil cases involving both Indians and non-Indians, recognition of tribal court jurisdiction should proceed on a tribe-bytribe basis. Similarly, because different tribal courts may wish to
exercise jurisdiction over different subject matters, m formal recognition should also proceed on a subject-by-subject basis. The
148. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
149. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT,
. supra note 6, at 113: "Jurisdiction is often a question of the specific geographic area
which is covered by the sovereign powers of a given government."
150. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 48-62 and accompanying text.
152. See supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text.
153. Some tribal courts are unable to assert jurisdiction over cases involving Indians
and non-Indians because the tribal constitution does not extend jurisdiction over nonIndians. INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 47-48, 101-02. The results of a
1976 survey of ioo reservations conducted by the American Indian Lawyer Training Program indicated that 39~,. of the tribes exerted jurisdiction over non-Indians and 46%
were in the process of changing their laws to be able to assert such jurisdiction or wished
to do so. Id. at 32. Also, a court may decide it is unable to exercise jurisdiction over a
case because it considers the case too complicated. Id. at 47, 50.
154. The 1976 American Indian Lawyer Training Program survey, see supra note
153, indicated that 15% of the tribes did not wish to exert jurisdiction over non-Indians.
Id. at 32.
155. For example, one area of jurisdiction which is of great importance to Indian
tribes is child welfare. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963
(1982), see infra text accompanying note 171, was enacted to ensure that Indian tribes
can be actively involved in Indian child welfare issues. Before the passage of the Act, 2535 ~,. of all Indian children were separated from their families for placement in foster
homes, adoptive homes, or institutions. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978).
Most decisions as to whether Indian children should be removed from their homes, and
where they would be raised, were made by non-Indian authorities. See 25 U.S.C.
§ 1901(4). The Act "changed the basis upon which state and federal agencies make decisions affecting the custody of Indian children to one with a more conscientious regard for
the rights of Indian tribes, parents and children." Oversight of the Indian Child Welfare
Act: Hearing Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian A/fairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
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ultimate goal of the recognition process is that interested tribes
will exercise jurisdiction over all reservation-based civil cases in
which both an Indian and a non-Indian are parties. This will
further the long-term goal of developing tribal governments into
fully operational sovereigns that exercise the same powers and
shoulder the same responsibilities as other local governments. 156
Congress could enact a statute to establish a procedure for
formal federal recognition of tribal court civil jurisdiction. One
could argue, however, that the executive department with authority over Indian affairs, the Department of the Interior, already has the power to establish procedures for federal recognition of tribal court civil jurisdiction. Pursuant to its broad
powers over Indian affairs, 167 Congress may restrict Indian tribal
court jurisdiction, but congressional approval is not needed to
give the tribes adjudicatory jurisdiction over civil cases arising
within their territory. Tribes retain, as an element of their inherent sovereignty, civil jurisdiction over all causes of action arising
on the reservation, regardless of whether a non-Indian is involved, provided that components of this jurisdiction are not
limited by the federal government. 168 Such limitations on jurisdiction must be explicitly stated in acts of Congress or
treaties. 169
The Department of the Interior, acting through the BIA, is
the prime agent for ensuring that the federal government carries
out the United States' "permanent obligation to protect and enhance Indian lands, resources, and tribal self-government." 160
The Commissioner of Indian Affairs has broad authority to manage "all Indian affairs and . . . all matters arising out of Indian
relations." 161 Pursuant to this authority, the BIA set up Courts
of Indian Offenses on reservations. 162 In a nineteenth century
district court case, United States v. Clapox, 163 the court held
118 (1980) (statement of Steven Unger, Executive Director, Association of Am. Indian
Affairs, Inc.).
Other areas in which tribes may be especially interested in asserting jurisdiction in
cases involving both Indians and non-Indians include divorce proceedings, consumer
debt actions, and torts. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text; see also infra
note 187.
156. 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 13.
157. See supra notes 32-47 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 65 and accompanying text; see also AIPRC TASK FORCE FouR,
supra note 2, at 89.
159. AIPRC TASK FORCE FouR, supra note 2, at 89.
160. 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 247.
161. 25 u.s.c. § 2 (1982).
162. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
163. 35 F. 575 (D. Or. 1888).
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that the Department of the Interior has the authority to establish on a reservation a Court of Indian Offenses and "to specify
the acts or conduct concerning which it shall have jurisdiction. "164 The court recognized the power of the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs to set up courts on reservations and to specify the
extent of their jurisdiction. 1611 Congress acknowledged the validity of the Commissioner's action by providing funding for the
Courts of Indian Offenses, 166 which still exist today where they
have not been replaced by tribal courts. 167 Analogous to the authority to establish courts on Indian reservations is the authority
to recognize formally the extent of the tribal courts' jurisdiction.168 Accordingly, the Department of the Interior, acting
through the BIA, is the appropriate entity to assume the responsibility for formally recognizing civil jurisdiction that is retained
and claimed by Indian tribes. The exercise of BIA authority in
this manner would support the federal government's policy of
strengthening tribal government. 169 Such an assumption of responsibility is also quite consistent with the role of the BIA and
the Department of the Interior in granting approval of other tribal actions. 170
The Department of the Interior already exercises responsibility for recognizing tribal court jurisdiction in one area. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978171 provides a mechanism
whereby tribes that have become subject to state jurisdiction
pursuant to any federal law112 may reassume exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings. 173 Interested tribes must
submit to the Secretary of the Interior a suitable plan for reas164. Id. at 577.
165. The court based its conclusion on statutory authority given to the Secretary of
the Interior to supervise public business relating to the Indians; to the Commissioner of
Indian Affairs to manage all Indian affairs and matters arising out of Indian relations
(now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1982)); and to the President to prescribe regulations to
carry into effect acts relating to Indian affairs (now codified at 25 U.S.C. § 9 (1982)). Id.
at 576-77.
166. See supra note 68.
167. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
168. See generally supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
170. See, e.g., 25 U.S.C. § 81 (1982) (Contracts with Indian tribes or Indians); id.
§ 396a (Leases of unallotted lands for mining purposes; duration of leases); id. § 397
(Leases of lands for grazing or mining); id. § 476 (Organization of Indian tribes; constitution and bylaws; special election).
171. 25 u.s.c. §§ 1901-1963 (1982).
172. See supra note 79.
173. 25 U.S.C. § 1918 (1982). It has been made clear that tribes may reassume jurisdiction without relinquishing their legal arguments that they already had such jurisdiction concurrently with the state. 44 Fed. Reg. 45,092 (1979) (modifying 25 C.F.R. § 13.1).
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suming this jurisdiction. 174 This petition for reassumption must
include a description of the tribal court system, copies of tribal
rules and procedures for the exercise of jurisdiction over child
custody matters, and citations to the tribal constitutional provision authorizing tribal jurisdiction over child custody matters. 175
Once a tribe has presented a plan for exercising jurisdiction over
child welfare cases, the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs reviews the petition and approves it if: (1) the petition is complete; (2) the tribal constitution authorizes such jurisdiction; (3)
the tribal court appears able to exercise jurisdiction over Indian
child custody matters in a manner consistent with due process
and the other safeguards, patterned after the Bill of Rights, that
are embodied in the Indian Civil Rights Act; (4) sufficient child
care services will be available; and (5) the tribe has a procedure
for clearly identifying persons who will be subject to the tribe's
jurisdiction. 176 The Assistant Secretary publishes a notice of approval of the petition in the Federal Register. 177 The notice
must clearly define the territory subject to the reassumption of
jurisdiction, and a copy of the notice must be sent to the tribe
and to the attorney general, governor, and highest court of the
state affected. 178 Several tribes have already reassumed child
custody jurisdiction under this procedure. 179
If the Assistant Secretary does not approve the plan submitted, the BIA must immediately send reasons for disapproval to
174. 25 U.S.C. § 1918(a) (1982).
175. 25 C.F.R. § 13.ll(a) (1986).
176. Id. § 13.12(a).
177. Id. § 13.14(a)(3).
178. Id. § 13.14(b).
179. See Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Indian Child
Custody Proceedings by the Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,337 (1982);
Receipt and Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Indian Child
Custody Proceedings by the Passamaquoddy Tribe, 47 Fed. Reg. 3414 (1982); Notice of
Receipt and Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Indian Child
Custody Proceedings by the Penobscot Indian Nation, 46 Fed. Reg. 27,397 (1981); Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Indian Child Custody Proceedings by the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians, Hayward,
Wis., 46 Fed. Reg. 15,579 (1981); Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction
over Indian Child Custody Proceedings by the Colville Confederated Tribes, 45 Fed.
Reg. 56,450 (1980); Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Indian
Child Custody Proceedings by the Muckleshoot Tribe, 45 Fed. Reg. 49,363 (1980); Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Indian Child Custody Proceedings by the Spokane Tribe, 45 Fed. Reg. 47,926 (1980); Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction over Indian Child Custody Proceedings by the Omaha Tribe, 45
Fed. Reg. 20,568 (1980); and Approval of Petition for Reassumption of Jurisdiction Confederated Tribes and Bands, Yakima Indian Nation, 45 Fed. Reg. 6479 (1980). For a
recent petition for reassumption of jurisdiction, see Receipt of Petition for Reassumption
of Jurisdiction; Ely Colony Council of Ely, NV, 50 Fed. Reg. 43,007 (1985).
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the petitioning tribe 180 and offer technical assistance to correct
the defect in the original plan. 181 After the tribe has taken action
to overcome the deficiencies of the first petition, the tribe may
re-petition for recognition. 182 One tribe whose initial petition
was not approved has reassumed jurisdiction under the re-petitioning procedure. 183
A similar procedure should be used for recognition of the civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction of tribes that have not been made subject to state jurisdiction. 184 A tribe seeking federal recognition of
its civil adjudicatory jurisdiction in a certain subject area would
submit a petition setting out its plan for exercising jurisdiction.
The petition should include a citation to the provision in the
tribal constitution authorizing the tribal court to exercise jurisdiction, a description of the tribal court, copies of tribal ordinances establishing court procedures, and an estimate of the
population of the reservation. The Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs should approve the petition as long as it is complete
and the tribal court appears able to exercise jurisdiction in a
manner that meets the requirements of the Indian Civil Rights
Act. A tribe whose petition is not approved should receive technical assistance to correct the deficiencies perceived by the Assistant Secretary. The Assistant Secretary would publish a notice in the Federal Register stating that the Department of the
Interior has approved a petition for recognition, and that the
tribe will exercise jurisdiction over the subject area in question.
The tribal court's jurisdiction should be recognized as exclusive,
unless Congress has granted state jurisdiction, in which case it
shall be concurrent.
Once a tribe's civil jurisdiction has been formally recognized
in all civil subject-matter areas, its tribal courts will be able to
operate with the certainty that their exercise of jurisdiction will
be respected. Non-Indians who enter into reservation-based contracts, for example, will have notice that disputes over the contract will be decided in tribal court. Non-Indians entering the
reservation, or residing on it, will have notice that torts they
commit on the reservation will be litigated in tribal court. Tribal
courts would be able to assume a complete role in the adjudica180. 25 C.F.R. § 13.14(c) (1986).
181. Id. § 13.16.
182. Id. § 13.14(d).
183. See 46 Fed. Reg. 15,579 (1981) (Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians).
184. See supra note 79.
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tion of civil disputes involving both Indians and non-Indians on
the reservation.

B. Implementation
To fully effectuate this Note's proposal, a number of important changes must first be made. Tribes that wish to assert jurisdiction over civil disputes involving non-Indians must modify
tribal codes and constitutions that do not authorize their court
system to exercise such jurisdiction. 18 ~ In some cases these modifications require approval by the BIA. 186 Tribes must also determine what laws will be applied in the subject area in which they
are seeking certification of their courts' jurisdiction, 187 if they
have not already done so, and fill in any gaps in the content of
tribal law codes. 188
In some cases, changes are needed in the attitudes of tribal
government officials. Judges in some tribal court systems have
complained of tribal council interference with the courts. 189 Tribal governments that have not yet done so must recognize the
need for independent operation of the courts and the important
role tribal courts play in furthering tribal self-government and
self-determination. 10O
Attitudes of neighboring jurisdictions also must change. Tribal
courts have difficulty getting neighboring jurisdictions to recognize their judgments. 191 Recognition, when given, is often informal and inconsistent. 192 Very few states currently give full faith
and credit to tribal judgments. 193 Clearly, for formal certification
by the federal government that a tribe has exclusive jurisdiction
over a subject area to be meaningful, tribal exercises of that ju185. See supra note 153.
186. INDIAN COURTS AND THE FUTURE, supra note 14, at 41-42.
187. Tribal courts use a mixture of tribal code provisions and federal, state, and
traditional law. Tribal codes commonly provide that state law can be applied when an
area is not covered by code provisions. Id. at 43. For recommendations on tribal legislation and codification, see id. at 97 (inadequate tribal laws), 110-12 (codification and customary law), 113-14 (juvenile law). Reexamination of all tribal law and tribal codes was
suggested. Id. at 156-61.
188. Id. at 39, 97.
189. Id. at 39-40, 70-71, 86, 94.
190. Id. at 86 ("[S]upport for courts is increasing, and many judges stated that tribal
government officials have begun to realize that the tribal court ultimately defends the
tribe's sovereignty.").
191. Id. at 80.
192. Id.
193. As of 1978, only two states gave full faith and credit to tribal judgments. Id.
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risdiction must be recognized by other court systems. As the Solicitor of the Interior stated in 1934, "[I]n the fields of civil controversy the rules and decisions of the tribe and its officers have
a force that State courts and Federal courts will respect." 194
Once tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over all reservation-based civil cases formally recognized by the federal government, and their judgments receive full faith and credit in other
jurisdictions, they will be able to exercise the same responsibilities as other local court systems, 1911 and thus play an important
role in the full development of tribal self-government.

CONCLUSION

Indian tribal courts are an important element in the achievement of the congressional goal of Indian self-government and
self-determination. Tribal court civil jurisdiction extends to all
reservation-based disputes unless that jurisdiction has been restricted by federal action. In National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, the Supreme Court determined that the extent of tribal court jurisdiction over civil cases
involving non-Indians is a question of federal law that should
first be examined by the tribal court, but the tribal court jurisdictional decision can be reviewed in federal district court. A
layer of federal court review is thus imposed above the tribal
court systems, constituting a degree of federal court interference
that is contrary to the intention of Congress and the Executive.
A better approach to establishing the boundaries of tribal
court civil jurisdiction is to establish a procedure in the Department of the Interior whereby an individual tribe could petition
for federal recognition of its exclusive, retained civil jurisdiction.
Tribes could apply for recognition of jurisdiction over individual
subject areas, so that recognition would take place in an orderly
manner reflecting tribal interests and capabilities. Once the federal government formally recognizes tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction, reservation residents and visitors will have notice that tribal courts will exercise jurisdiction over reservation-based civil
cases, and tribal judgments will be entitled to full faith and
194. Powers of Indian Tribes, 1 Op. Solie. Interior 445, 471 (1934).
195. 1 AIPRC FINAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 13.
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credit. The tribal courts will then be able to play their proper
role in tribal government.

-Allison M. Dussias

